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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Final Judgment forming the basis of this appeal
was entered on August 4, 1987, in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Tooele County of the State of Utah and Constitutes a judgment
from which an appeal may be taken as defined by Section 77-35-26
and Rule 26 of the Utah Code Annotated.
A Notice of Appeal meeting the requirements of Rule 3
of the Rules of the Court of Appeals was timely filed within the
time allowed

by Rule 4.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In October, 1986, defendant appellant Layne Kenneth
Lundstrom was arrested for Driving on Revocation.

The matter

did not come to trial until April 20, 1987, at which time the
arresting officer failed to appear.

Instead of dismissing the

case at that time, the judge continued it to a future date.
At the trial held June 26, 1987, the arresting officer was
present and gave testimony.

During the trial, the prosecutor

introduced into evidence a rap sheet which showed that defendant
had once been convicted of embezzlement in the federal courts.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The following issues are presented for appeal:
1.

Was defendant's Constitutional right to a speedy

trial denied him by the Court in delaying eight months in trying
the matter?
2.

Did the Court err in permitting the introduction

into evidence of prior unrelated crimes:
3.

to-wit: embezzlement?

Was the appellant denied due process when the

arresting officer failed

to appear for trial and the Court

continued the case instead of dismissing it?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT V.

Pa

£e
6,7

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VI

5

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 55

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal is from a Final Judgment entered in the
Sixth Circuit Court for Tooele County, State of Utah, by the
Honorable Edward A. Watson.

Particularly, this appeal quest-

ions the Court's finding of guilty agaittst appellant where the
Court did not bring him to trial for ei£ht months, continued
the case instead of dismissing it when appellant's accuser
was not present for trial, and at trial introduced into evidence over appellant's objection a prior unrelated charge.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
Appellant was found guilty of Driving on Revocation

and sentenced to 60 days in jail and a fine of $1,000.00. He
was put on 1 year's probation with Adult Probation and Parole
and the Court suspended all but two days of the jail and $600
of the fine.

STATMENT OF FACTS

On October 24, 1986, Appellant Layne Kenneth
Lundstrom was arrested in Tooele County, State of Utah, for
Driving on Revocation.

He plead not guilty to the charge and

the matter was set down for trial.

However, trial in the matter

was not held until April 20, 1987, at which time the arresting
officer failed to appear.

Instead of dismissing the case at

that time, the judge continued the trial to a future date.
The trial was held on June 26, 1987, more than eight
months after appellant's arrest.

At the trial, the arresting

officer was present and gave testimony.

The prosecuting attorney

attempted to intorduce into evidence a rap sheet which showed
appellant had once been convicted of embezzlement in the federal courts, and over appellant's objection, it was admitted
into evidence.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mr. Lundstrom makes the appeal asserting that the
trial Court erred in continuing his trial date when his accuser
did not appear at the earlier trial date set, and that his Constititional Right to a speedy trial was denied in the Court

delaying a total of eight months until t^rial.

Furthermore, he

asserts that the introduction into evidence during the trial of
a prior unrelated crime was violative of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

It is the position of the appellant that his Constitutional Right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
was denied him by the Court in delaying more than eight months
after appellant's arrest before bringing the matter to trial.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled in the landmark case of Barker vs. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (1972), that whether
or not a case must be dismissed for lackj of a speedy trial requires
a balancing test.

The conduct of both the defendant and the pros-

ecution are weighed and such factors as length of delay, reason
for the delay, defendant's assertion or non-assertion of right,
and prejudice to the defendant are considered.

The Utah State

Supreme Court has adopted this test in State vs. Hafen, 593 P2d
538.
Appellant's contention is thatt eight months is a delay
of sufficient length to be prejudicial ^nd that any other factors
considered by the Court do not erase th^ prejudice.

No factors

regarding a justifiable reason for the delay have been brought to
appellant's attention.

-5-

Although the defendant appellant might not have raised
the speedy trial issue by motion before trial, this does not preclude him from raising the issue on appeal.

Furthermore, appellant

asserts that there was substantial prejudice to him by reason of
the lengthy delay.

Not only was there great anxiety sustained by

the accused over this amount of time, he was also prevented from
making various living and job arrangements because of his lack of
certainty over whether or not he would have his driver's license
further revoked, or his driving privilege reinstated.

POINT II

Appellant further contends that the permitting of the
prosecutor to enter into evidence during trial a rap sheet of a
conviction in federal court of embezzlement was improper.

Rule

55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence state that evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit a crime or civil
wrong on another specified occasion.
valid reason for the Court having

Therefore, there was no

allowed the introduction of

said evidence.

POINT III

Appellant further avers that his Constitutional rights
of Due Process as guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and made applicable to the states through the Four-

-6-

teenth Amendment were denied him when the prosecutor's accusing
witness against appellant was not present for trial on April 20,
1987, and the Court continued the case instead of dismissing

it.

Fundamental standards of fairness would dictate that under the
circumstances to which are referred, th^ case against appellant
would be dismissed, where he is present with his attorney and
prepared to go forward on the date and time scheduled by the
Court.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully

requested

that the appellant's conviction for Driving on Revocation be reversed and the case be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

£L day of November, 1987.

RONALD H. GOODMAN —^
Attorney for Appellant
La^ne Kenneth Lundstrom
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1—

The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, postage
prepaid, on the _£^<iay of November, 1987, to the following:
Allan M. Williams
Tooele County Attorney
47 South Main
Tooele, Utah 84074
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THE U. S. CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT 11(1791].
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Amis, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT HI [1791].
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war| but in a manner to be prescribed
by law.
AMENDMENT JV[1791].
The right of the people to be secure ill their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT: V[1791],
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI[1791].
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district whereifTthe
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be '"f^TflfH n f fha nptnrp ^nf* .r^sp nf the accusation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnessejs in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
• AMENDMENT VII[1791].
In Suits at common law, where! the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII [1791].
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX[1791].
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage other^ retained by the people.
xcvii

Evidence R. 54, 55

6-105
insurance where relevant upon an issue
other than the quality of the insured's conduct.

Utah Decisions:
Comparable
Provisions:

Kan. Stat. § 60-454 and NJ.R.E. 53 are
identical with the Utah Rule. Cal. Evid.
Code § 1155 is essentially identical to the

Utah Rule.

Rule 55. Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs
Utah Rule:

Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person
committed a crime or civil wrong on a
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove
his disposition to commit crime or civil
wrong as the basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong on
another specified occasion but, subject to
Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other
material fact including absence of mistake
or accident, motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.

Utah Note:

The generally accepted rule prohibits evidence of another crime or civil wrong as
proof that a person committed a crime or
civil wrong on a specified occasion. The
things set forth above are only exemplary
and not exclusive.

Uniform Rule:

Identical with Utah Rule.

Uniform Comment: This states the generally accepted rule rejecting evidence of another crime or civil
wrong as proof that a person committed a
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion.
The limitation is directed against the idea
that when it is shown that a person committed a crime on a former occasion there
arises an inference that he has a disposition

538
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it is unnecessary to be concerned with the
issue as to whether, and to what extent, Mr.
Meikle was the agent of defendant First
Colony, and w^hat may or n|iay not have
been said between him and the Williamses
inconsistent with the terms 0f the conditional receipt.
It is indeed unfortunate that Mr. Williams died prior to taking the scheduled
physical examination. Nevertheless, we are
impelled to the conclusion tha|t under facts
which appear Without dispute, there is no
basis upon whi<fch any liability for that misfortune can justly be imposed upon the
defendant insurance company.t
Affirmed. Costs to defendant
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.,
concur.
STEWART, t , having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.

KEY NUMBER SYSTEM)

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Darrell Graff HAFEN, Defendant
and Appellant

1. Criminal Law <&=»577.10(3)
Where felony defendant did no
first motion to dismiss for lack oi
trial until after he had been remov
jurisdiction, defendant was outside
diction for four and a half months,
delay in prosecution was due to def
own actions such as refusing public
er as counsel and appointment of ne
sel on his return to jurisdiction, and
ant's defense was not substantia
paired by pretrial delay, there was i
tional delay of an oppressive chara
suiting in prejudice to defendant
fendant's right to speedy trial ^
abused.
2. False Pretenses <&=»52
Where defendant who was on 1
theft by deception offered no eviden
his intent involved in subject trail
and offered no evidence that he hac
to believe or did believe that checl
be paid upon presentment for paym<
al court's failure to give defenda
quested jury instruction referring tc
ic intent to defraud was not error.
1953, 76-6-405.

Craig Stephens Cook, Salt Lake C
defendant and appellant
R. Paul VanDam, Salt Lake Ci
plaintiff and respondent

No. 15885.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 22, 1979.
Defendant was convicted before the
Third District Court, Salt LaKe County,
Dean Conder, J., of theft by deception. Defendant appealed. The Supijeme Court,
Hyde, J., held that: (1) defendant was not
denied a speedy trial, and (2) trial court did
not err in failing to give defendant's requested jury instruction referring to specific intent to defraud.
Affirmed.

HYDE, District Judge:
The defendant Darrell Graff HaJ
peals his conviction by a jury of Tl
Deception, in violation of 76-6-405,
1953. His claims of error are:
(1) that he was denied a speed]
and
(2) that the trial court erred in fai
give defendant's requested jury i
tion referring to specific intent
fraud.
Concerning defendant's contentioi
he was not given a speedy trial, the
tial facts are these: A State complai

STATE v. HAFEN

Utah
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Cite as 593 P.2d538

filed against the defendant March 4, 1977,
** A a. warrant was issued thereon. Defend*jjt was brought to Salt Lake City in July
of 197? from New York State. On July 11,
1977 defendant was detained in the Salt
rake County Jail pursuant to the comolaint On that same date, defendant was
brought before the City Court, where the
complaint was read and bail set at $50,000.00. The defendant, present without
counsel, was referred to the Legal Defender
attorney. The court also at that time ordered hearing set for July 26, 1977.
On July 27, 1977, defendant appeared
without counsel and moved for a mistrial.
The motion was denied. Defendant's motion for the court to appoint private counsel
was also denied. Defendant at that time
objected to the State proceeding further in
the matter because a motion to transfer
jurisdiction to the United States District
Court had been filed. A handwritten motion to stay proceedings before the City
Court until Chief Judge Willis Ritter could
rule on jurisdiction was filed by the defendant on July 28,1977. The July 27th hearing
was continued to August 9 because of evacuation of the building due to a gasoline
leak. On August 9,1977, the attorney from
the Legal Defender's office appeared on
behalf of the defendant, and informed the
court that the Federal Government had removed the defendant from jail and transported him to Los Angeles County in California, pursuant to a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum, and at that time
filed a motion and demand for a speedy
trial. The court ordered the hearing continued to August 23rd on stipulation.

vember 11, 1977. On November 11, the
court ordered the arraignment continued to
December 9. On December 11, 1977, by
stipulation of counsel, the court ordered the
hearing reset to December 13. On December 13, defendant was returned to Salt
Lake County Jail, and appeared in court
without counsel. He refused to let a Legal
Defender attorney represent him. The
court ordered his current attorney appointed to represent him, and ordered the hearing continued to January 12, 1978.

On August 23rd, the defendant was not
present in court, and the hearing was therefore continued to October 11, 1977. On
September 19, 1977, defendant's attorney
appeared without defendant and moved for
a dismissal based upon the failure to obtain
a speedy trial. The motion was denied, and
hearing was continued to October 11, 1977,
the attorney appeared without defendant
and the court was told that defendant was
still in California. A motion to dismiss was
again made, and denied. The court ordered
a continuation of the arraignment until No-

As to whether appellant's right to a
speedy trial was violated under Federal
law, a leading and analytical case in this*
area is Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92
S.Ct 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In that
case, petitioner was arrested and subsequently subjected to sixteen continuances
and spent ten months in jail until he was
able to post bond. He filed a motion to
dismiss after the eleventh continuance, but
the motion was denied. Four years after
his release on bond, he was finally tried.
At the trial, his motion to dismiss due to

The court also ordered a bond-reduction
hearing scheduled for December 14. This
hearing was continued to December 15,
wherein bail was reduced to $10,000.00. On
January 12,1978, a preliminary hearing was
held, at which time the defendant was
bound over to the District Court to stand
trial. The court ordered that the bond remain the same, and set an arraignment date
in District Court for January 20, 1978. On
January 12, 1978, appellant's present counsel filed a motion for dismissal based on
failure to provide defendant a speedy trial.
An Information was filed by the County
Attorney on January 19, and arraignment
was held on January 20 before a District
Court Judge. Trial was set for March 9,
1978. On March 6,1978, appellant's counsel
filed a second motion for dismissal based
upon failure to provide defendant a speedy
trial. Trial was held March 9th and 10th,
1978. Defendant was able to post bond in
January, thus being incarcerated approximately six months, including the time spent
in California, which accounted for four and
one-half months of that time.
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lack of speedy trial was again delnied. The
gence or over-crowded courts, shou
conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky
weighed less heavily, but neverth
should be considered, since the ulti
Court of Appeals. Writ of Habeas Corpus
responsibility for such circumste
was sought in the United States District
must rest with the government n
Court and rejected, with leave to appeal.
than with the defendant Finally, a
The Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the
reason, such as a missing witness, sfr
United States Supreme Court In so doing,
serve to justify appropriate delay.2
the Supreme Court set forth certain guidelines to be followed in determining whether
The court spoke to the fourth crit
a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, prejudice to the defendant, as follows:
and specifically rejected a fixed time period
. . . prejudice . . . sh
and demand-waiver approach:
be assessed in light of the interes
The approach we accept is a (balancing
defendant's which the speedy trial r
test, in which the conduct of both the
was designed to protect This court
prosecution and the defendant are.
identified three such interests: (i) to
weighed.
vent oppressive pre-trial incarcerati
(ii) to minimize anxiety and concern
A balancing test necessarily compels
the accused; and (iii) to limit the poss
courts to approach speedy trial cases on
ity that the defense will be impaired,
an ad hoc basis. We can do little more
these, the most serious is the last.5
than identify some of the factors which
the court should assess in determining
The court finally concluded:
whether a particular defendant has been
We regard none of the four fac
deprived of his right Though some
identified above as either necessary
might express them in different ways, we
sufficient condition to the finding o
identify four such factors: Length of Dedeprivation of the right to speedy ta
lay, the reason for the delay, the defendRather, they are related factors,
ant's assertion of his right, and prejudice
must be considered together with s
1
to the defendant
other circumstances as may be relevs
The court went on to detail and I expound
some of these factors:
[1] Appellant contends that the len
The length of delay is to some extent a of delay must include the four and one-r
triggering mechanism. Until there is months that he was incarcerated in Calii
some delay which is presumptively preju- nia. It should be noted that the first i
dicial, there is no necessity for inquiry tion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial \
into the other factors that go into the not filed until after the appellant had b<
balance . . ., the length of delay removed from the jurisdiction of Utah
that will provoke such an inquiry is nec- California. Whether the period of time
essarily dependent upon the particular considered to be the one and one-h
circumstances of the case. .
months he was in the Salt Lake Coui
Closely related to the length of delay is Jail, or the total of six months includi
the reason . . . that justified the California, does not appear to be releva
delay. Here, too, different weights The fact is, he was outside the jurisdicti<
should be assigned to different reasons. and thereby the matter could not proce<
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in because he was charged with a felony a
order to hamper the defense should be his presence is necessary. The reasons i
weighed heavily against the government the delay appear to be appropriate in tl
A more neutral reason, such as negli- instance. Some of the delay was due
1. 407 U.S. 2191-2192, 92 S.Ct 523+524, 33
L.Ed.2d 116, 117.

3. 407 U.S. 525, 92 S.Ct 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d 11
4. Id.

2. 407 U.S. 524, 92 S.Ct 2192, 33 L.E4-2d 117.

STATE v. HAFEN
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appellant's own actions, such as refusing a
Legal Defender attorney as his counsel, requesting appointment of private counsel,
appointment of new counsel upon his return
from California, and withdrawal of the
Judge from hearing the case.
As to the fourth factor, prejudice to the
defendant, appellant concedes in his brief
that his defense was not substantially impaired by the pre-trial delay. The delays
were not all caused by the State, and those
that were appear to be appropriate and
necessary under the circumstances, and no
prejudice resulted to appellant's trial or the
preparation thereof.

in refusing to dismiss the action. The right
to a speedy trial is meant to be a shield
against oppression, and not a sword to be
used to decapitate the processes of justice.
The other point raised by appellant is
that the trial court committed error in failing to give appellant's requested jury instruction, referring to specific intent to defraud. The appellant offered a jury instruction which stated as follows:
Even though one makes, draws, utters or
delivers a check knowing that at that
time he does not have sufficient funds in
the bank on which it is drawn to pay it,
he does not have the requisite specific
intent to defraud if he in fact has good
reason to believe and honestly does believe that it will be paid upon presentment for payment

As to whether appellant's right to speedy
trial under the Utah Constitution and Utah
Statutory and Case Law was violated,
seems to be answered in the case of State v.
Archuletta, Utah, 577 P.2d 547, wherein it
The court instructed the jury in regard to
was stated:
the elements of the offense that they must
There is no doubt about the importance find beyond a reasonable doubt:
of complying with the requirements of
3. The property was obtained by decepboth the United States and Utah Constition;
tutions. The one accused of a crime is
4. That the defendant acted with a purentitled to prompt trial setting and dispopose to deprive the owner of said propersition of the charge if he so desires and
ty.
requests. The purpose of those ConstituThey were further instructed that the
tional provisions is to guard against any
term
"by deception" means:
intentional delay which may be oppres.
. . when a person intentionally:
sive or persecutorial in nature. In order
a)
creates
or confirms by words or conto avoid any such baneful effect, the reduct
an
impression
of law or fact that is
quirement of the law should be respected
false,
and
that
the
actor
does not believe
and complied with insofar as can be
it to be true, and that is likely to affect
achieved within the practical operation of
the judgment of another in the transacthe courts. However, the court does not
tion, or
lose jurisdiction because of such a delay,
b) fails to correct a false impression of
and unless there is some intentional delay
law or fact that the actor previously creof an oppressive character which results
ated or confirmed by words or conduct
in prejudice to the defendant, the
that is likely to affect the judgment of
processes of justice should not be wholly
another, and that the actor does not now
defeated thereby. It is for this reason
that this court has consistently held that
believe to be true.
the statutory time within which a trial
And further, that the term "purpose to
shall be held is directory, and not manda- deprive" means:
tory. [Emphasis added.]
. . . to have the conscious object to:
a)
withhold property permanently or for
The facts of this case do not show an
so
extended
a period, or to use under such
intentional delay of an oppressive character
circumstances
that a substantial portion
resulting in prejudice to the defendant
of
its
economic
value or the use and beneThe defendant's right to a speedy trial was
fit
thereof
would
be lost; or
not abused, and the trial court was correct
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b) restores the property only upon payment of reward or other compensation;
or
c) disposes of the property u^ider circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
The court further instructed the jury
that:
Knowledge or intent with which an act is
done denotes a state of mind and connotes a purpose in so acting. Knowledge
or intent being a state of mind is seldom
susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence and must ordinarily be inferred
from acts, conduct, statements, and circumstances.
The court further instructed the jury:
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, or wilfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result
[2] Defendant offered no evidence as to
his intent involved in this transaction, and
offered no evidence that he had reason to
believe or did believe that the check would
be paid upon presentment for payment.
Without some evidence at the trial to
justify a requested instruction, the court is
correct in refusing. In this instance, the
court correctly and fully instructed the jury
in regard to the requisite intent, and its
refusal to give the appellant's instruction as
phrased was not error.
The conviction is affirmed*
awarded.

No costs

CROCKETT, C. J., MAUGHAN and
HALL, JJ., and GEORGE E. B^LLIF, District Judge, concur.
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., having
disqualified themselves, do not participate
herein.

O

I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

WALL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
ited partnership, with Gordon Gn
general partner, Plaintiff and I
dent,
v.
GARDEN GATE DISTRIBUTING
Dennis Vanderlinden, and Steve
deriinden, Defendants and App
No. 15766.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 26, 1979.
General partnership brought act
conversion when judgment creditor,
obtained money judgment against r
gor, proceeded under writ of execu
seize mortgagor's inventory which w
subject of a "chattel mortgage" in f
mortgagee. The Third District Coui
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., <
judgment in favor of plaintiff, anc
ment creditor and others appealed
Supreme Court, Hall, J., held ths
judgment creditor failed to meet bu:
showing invalidity of recorded fi
statement due to insufficient addre
limited partnership could bring su
partnership's early failure to compl
assumed name statute did not disqu
as plaintiff in suit, and (4) evident
ported findings that seized invento
value equal to award.
Affirmed.
1. Secured Transactions <s=>93
Fact that chattel mortgage in t
general partnership was a post offi
did not mean that mortgage was de
as a financing statement as a matter
so that it would not perfect a security
est
2. Secured Transactions «=>101
It is burden of party asserting ii
ty of recorded financial statement
feet security interest to prove insuff
of address as a matter of fact

108

U. S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

alleged accomplice so that his testimony, if conviction resulted, would
be available at petitioner's trial. Before the accomplice was finally convicted, he was tried six times. Petitioner made no objection to the continuances until three and one-half
years after he was arrested. After the
accomplice was finally convicted, petitioner, after further delays because
of a key prosecution witness* illness,
was tried and convicted. In this habeas corpus proceeding the Court of
Appeals, concluding that petitioner
had waived his right to a speedy trial
for the period prior to his demand
for trial, and m any event had not been
prejudiced by the delay, affirmed the
District Court's judgment against petitioner. Held: A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy tnal cannot
be established by any inflexible rule

33 L Ed 2d

but can be determined only on an ad
hoc balancing basis, in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the
defendant are weighed. The court
should assess such factors as the
length of and reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant. In this
case the lack of any serious prejudice
to petitioner and the fact, as disclosed
by the record, that he did not want a
speedy trial outweigh opposing considerations and compel the conclusion
that petitioner was not deprived of his
due process right to a speedy trial.
442 F2d 1141, affirmed.
Powell, J., delivered
a unanimous Court.
a concurring opinion,
nan, J., joined, post, p
p 120.

the opinion for
White, J., filed
in which Bren536, 33 L Ed 2d

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
James E. Milliman argued the cause for petitioner, pro hac vice,
by special leave of court.
Robert W. Willmott, Jr., argued the cause for respondent, pro
hac vice, by special leave of court.
Briefs of Counsel, p 845, infra.
OPINION OF THE COURT
[407 US 515]
Mr. Justice Powell delivered the
opinion of the Court.
[ l , 2] Although a speedy trial is
guaranteed the accused by the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution, 1
this Court has dealt with that right
on
infrequent
occasions.
See
Beavers v Haubert, 198 US 77, 49
L Ed 950, 25 S Ct 573 (1905); Pollard v United States, 352 US 354,
1 L Ed 2d 393, 77 S Ct 481 (1957);
United States v Ewell, 383 US 116,
1. The Sixth Amendment provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with

15 L Ed 2d 627, 86 S Ct 773 (1966);
United States v Marion, 404 US 307,
30 L Ed 2d 468, 92 S Ct 455 (1971).
See also United States v Provoo, 17
FRD 183 (D Md), affd, 350 US 857,
100 L Ed 761, 76 S Ct 101 (1955).
The Court's opinion in Klopfer v
North Carolina, 386 US 213,18 L Ed
2d 1, 87 S Ct 988 (1967), established
that the right to a speedy trial is
"fundamental" and is imposed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States. 2
See Smith v Hooey, 393 US 374, 21
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."
2. "We hold here that the right to a
speedy trial is as fundamental as any of
the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment." 386 US, at 223, 18 L Ed 2d 8.
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L Ed 2d 607, 89 S Ct 575 (1969); the Kentucky Court of Appeals reDickey v Florida, 398 US 30, 26 L versed because of the admission of
Ed 2d 26, 90 S Ct 1564 (1970). As evidence obtained by an illegal
Mr. Justice Brennan
search. Manning v Commonwealth,
[407 US 516]
328 SW2d 421 (Ky 1959). At
pointed out in his third trial, Manning was again
his concurring opinion in Dickey, in convicted, and the Court of Appeals
none of these cases have we at- again reversed
tempted to set out the criteria by
C407 US 5173
which the speedy trial right is to be
because the trial
judged. 398 US, at 40-41, 26 L Ed court had not granted a change of
2d at 33-34. This case compels us venue. Manning v Commonwealth,
to make such an attempt.
346 SW2d 755 (Ky 1961). A
fourth trial resulted in a hung jury.
I
Finally, after five trials, Manning
On July 20, 1958, in Christian was convicted, in March 1962, of
County, Kentucky, an elderly couple murdering one victim, and after a
was beaten to death by intruders sixth trial, in December 1962, he was
wielding an iron tire tool. Two convicted of murdering the other.4
suspects, Silas Manning and Willie
The Christian County Circuit
Barker, the petitioner, were arrested Court holds three terms each year—
shortly thereafter. The grand jury in February, June, and September.
indicted them on September 15. Barker's initial trial was to take
Counsel was appointed on September place in the September term of 1958.
17, and Barker's trial was set for Oc- The first continuance postponed it
tober 21. The Commonwealth had until the February 1959 term. The
a stronger case against Manning, second continuance was granted for
and it believed that Barker could not one month only. Every term therebe convicted unless Manning testi- after for as long as the Manning
fied against him. Manning was nat- prosecutions were in process, the
urally unwilling to incriminate him- Commonwealth routinely moved to
self. Accordingly, on October 23, continue Barker's case to the next
the day Silas Manning was brought term. When the case was continued
to trial, the Commonwealth sought from the June 1959 term until the
and obtained the first of what was following September, Barker, having
to be a series of 16 continuances of spent 10 months in jail, obtained his
Barker's trial.8 Barker made no release by posting a $5,000 bond. He
objection. By first convicting Man- thereafter remained free in the comning, the Commonwealth would re- munity until his trial. Barker made
move possible problems of self-in- no objection, through his counsel,
crimination and would be able to to the first 11 continuances.
assure his testimony against Barker.
When on February 12, 1962, the
The Commonwealth encountered Commonwealth moved for the
more than a few difficulties in its twelfth time to continue the case unprosecution of Manning. The first til the following term. Barker's
trial ended in a hung jury. A sec- counsel filed a motion to dismiss
ond trial resulted in a conviction, but the indictment. The motion to dis3. There is no explanation in the record
why although Barker's initial trial was set
for October 21, no continuance was sought
until October 23, two days after the trial
should have begun.

4. Apparently Manning chose not to appeal these final two convictions.
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miss was denied two weeks later, United States District Court for the
and the Commonwealth's motion for Western District of Kentucky. Ala continuance was granted. The though the District Court rejected
Commonwealth was granted further the petition without holding a hearcontinuances in June 1962 and Sep- ing, the Court granted petitioner
tember 1962, to which Barker did leave to appeal in forma pauperis and
not object.
a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
On appeal, the Court of ApIn February 1963, the first term
peals
for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed
of court following Manning's final
the
District
Court. 442 F2d 1141
conviction, the
Commonwealth
(1971).
It
ruled that Barker
moved to set Barker's trial for
had
waived
his
speedy trial claim
March 19. But on the day schedfor
the
entire
period
before Februuled for trial, it again moved for a
ary
1963,
the
date
on
which the
continuance until the June term. It
court
believed
he
had
first
objected
gave as its reason the illness
to
the-delay
by
filing
a
motion
to
[407 US 518]
dismiss.In
this
belief
the
court
of the
ex-sheriff who was the chief investi- was mistaken, for the record regating .officer in the case. To this veals
[407 US 519]
continuance, Barker objected unsucthat
the motion was filed
cessfully.
in February 1962. The CommonThe witness was still unable to wealth so conceded at oral argument
testify in June, and the trial, which before this Court.6 The court held
had been set for June 19, was con- further that the remaining period
tinued again until the September after the date on which Barker first
term over Barker's objection. This raised his claim and before his trial
time the court announced that the —which it thought was only eight
case would be dismissed for lack of months but which was actually 20
prosecution if it were not tried dur- months—was not unduly long. In
ing the next term. The final trial addition, the court held that Barker
date was set for October 9, 1963. had shown no resulting prejudice,
On that date, Barker against moved and that the illness of the ex-sheriff
to dismiss the indictment, and this was a valid justification for the detime specified that his right to a lay. We granted Barker's petition
speedy trial had been violated.5 The for certiorari. 404 US 1037, 30 L Ed
motion was denied; the trial com- 2d 729, 92 S Ct 719 (1972).
menced with Manning as the chief
prosecution witness; Barker was
II
convicted and given a life sentence.
[3, 4] The right to a speedy trial
Barker appealed his conviction to is generically different from any of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, rely- the other rights enshrined in the
ing in part on his speedy trial claim. Constitution for the protection of
The court affirmed. Barker v Com- the accused. In addition to the genmonwealth, 385 SW2d 671 (Ky eral concern that all accused persons
1964). In February 1970 Barker be treated according to decent and
petitioned for habeas corpus in the fair procedures, there is a societal
5. The written motion Barker filed alleged that he had objected to every continuance since February 1959. The record
does not reflect any objections until the
motion to dismiss, filed in February 1962,

and the objections to the continuances
sought by the Commonwealth in March
1963 and June 1963.
6. Tr of Oral Arg 33.
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interest in providing a speedy trial
which exists separate from, and at
times in opposition to, the interests
of the accused. The inability of
courts to provide a prompt trial
has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts
which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate
more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system.7 In
addition, persons released on bond
for lengthy periods awaiting trial
have an opportunity to commit other
crimes.8 It must be of little comfort
to the residents of Christian County,
Kentucky, to know that Barker was
at large on bail for over four years
while accused of a vicious

This contributes to the overcrowding and generally deplorable state of
those institutions.11 Lengthy exposure to these conditions "has a
destructive effect on human character and makes the rehabilitation
of the individual offender much
more difficult."12 At time? the result may even be violent rioting.13
Finally, lengthy pretrial detention is
costly. The cost of maintaining a
prisoner in jail varies from $3 to $9
per day, and this amounts to millions across
[407 US 521]

and brutal
murder of which he was ultimately
convicted. Moreover, the longer an
accused is free awaiting trial, the
more tempting becomes his opportunity to jump bail and escape.9 Finally, delay between arrest and punishment may have a detrimental
effect on rehabilitation.10
If an accused cannot make bail,
he is generally confined, as was
Barker for 10 months, in a local jail.

the Nation.14 In addition, society loses wages which
might have been earned, and it must
often support families of incarcerated breadwinners.
[5, 6] A second difference between
the right to speedy trial and the
accused's other constitutional rights
is that deprivation of the right may
work to the accused's advantage.
Delay is not an uncommon defense
tactic. As the time between the
commission of the crime and trial
lengthens, witnesses may become
unavailable or their memories may
fade. Jf the witnesses support the
prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And

7. Report of the President's Commission
on Crime in the District of Columbia 256
(1966).
8. In Washington, D. C, in 1968, 70.1%
of the persons arrested for robbery and
released prior to trial- were re-arrested
while on bail. Mitchell, Bail Reform and
the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention,
55 Va L Rev 1223, 1236 (1969), citing Report of the Judicial Council Committee to
Study the Operation of the Bail Reform
Act in the District of Columbia 20-21
(1969).
9. The number of these offenses has been
increasing. See Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, 1971, p 321.
10. "[I]t is desirable that punishment
should follow offence as closely as possible;
for its impression upon the minds of men
is weakened by distance, and, besides, distance adds to the uncertainty of punish-

ment, by affording new chances of escape."
J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 326
(Ogden ed 1931).
11. To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquillity, Final Report of the
National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence 152 (1969).
12. Testimony of James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons, Hearings on
Federal Bail Procedures before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and
the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong- 2d Sess, 4&
(1964).
13. E. g., the "Tombs" riots in New
York City in 1970. N. Y. Ti^es, Oct. 3,
1970, p 1, col 8.
14. The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society, A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 131 (1967)^

[407 US 520]

112

U. S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

it is the prosecution which carries
the burden of proof. Thus, unlike
the right to counsel or the right to
be free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to
speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to defend
himself.
[7-9] Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the right to speedy
trial is a more vague concept than
other procedural rights. It is, for
example, impossible to determine
with precision when the right has
been denied. We cannot definitely
say how long is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be
swift but deliberate.15 As a consequence, there is no fixed point in
the criminal process when the State
can put the defendant to the choice
of either exercising or waiving the
right to a speedy trial. If, for example, the State moves for
[407 US 522]

CA

,

33 L Ed 2d

"The right of a speedy trial is neeessarily relative. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a
defendant. It does not preclude the
rights of public justice." 198 US, at
87, 49 L Ed at 954.
[l 0] The amorphous quality of the
right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of
the indictment when the right has
been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means
that a defendant who may be guilty
of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious than ai\ exclusionary rule or a reversal for -a new
trial,18 but it is the only possible
remedy.

m
Perhaps because the speedy trial
right is so slippery, two rigid approaches are urged upon us as ways
of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts experience

a 60-day
continuance, granting that continuance is not a violation of the right to
[407 US 5233
speedy trial unless the circumin
stances of the case are such that
protecting
the
right.
The
first
sugfurther delay would endanger the
values the right protects. It is im- gestion is that we hold that the Conpossible to do more than generalize stitution requires a criminal defendabout when those circumstances ex- ant to be offered a trial within a
ist. There is nothing comparable to specified time period. The result of
the point in the process when a de- such a ruling would have the virtue
fendant exercises or waives his right of clarifying when the right is into counsel or his right to a jury trial. fringed and of simplifying courts'
Thus, as we recognized in Beavers v application of it. Recognizing this,
Haubert, supra, any inquiry into a some legislatures have enacted laws,
speedy trial claim necessitates a and some courts have adopted procemore narrowly
functional analysis of the right in dural rules which
17
define
the
right.
The
United States
the particular context of the case:
15. "[I]n large measure because of the
many procedural safeguards provided an
accused, the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are designed to move at a
deliberate pace. A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious
effect both upon the rights of the accused
and upon the ability of society to protect
itself." United States v Ewell, 383 US
116, 120, 15 L Ed 2d 627, 630, 86 S Ct 773
(1966).

16. Mr. Justice White noted in his opinion for the Court in Ewell, supra, at 121,
15 L Ed 2d at 631, that overzealous application of this remedy would infringe "the
societal interest in trying people accused
of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error. . . ."
17. For examples, see American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial 14-16 (Approved
Draft 1968); Note, The Right to a Speedy
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Court of Appeals for the Second stitutional standards, butj our apCircuit has promulgated rules for proach must be less precis^.
the district courts in that Circuit
[14] The second suggested alterestablishing that the government
must be ready for trial within six native would restrict consideration
[407 US 524]
months of the date of arrest, except
of
the
right
to those cases in which
in unusual circumstances, or the
18
the
accused
has
demanded a speedycharge will be dismissed.
This
trial.
Most
States
have recognized
type of rule is also recommended by
19
what
is
loosely
referred
to a^ the "dethe American Bar Association.
mand rule,"20 although eight States
[11-13] But such a result would reject it.21 It is not clear, however,
require this Court to engage in legis- precisely what is meant by that
lative or rulemaking activity, rather term. Although every federal court
than in the adjudicative process to of appeals that has considered the
which we should confine our efforts. question has endorsed sojne kind
We do not establish procedural rules of demand rule, some have regarded
for the States, except when man- the rule within the concept of
dated by the Constitution. We find waiver,22 whereas others have
no constitutional basis for holding viewed it as a factor to be weighed
[407 US 525]
that the speedy trial right can be
quantified into a specified number of in assessing whether there has been
days or months. The States, of a deprivation of the speedy trial
course, are free to prescribe a rea- right.23 We shall refer to the
sonable period consistent with con- former approach as the demandCnminal Trial, 57 Col L Rev 846, 863
(1957).
18. Second Circuit Rules Regarding
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases
(1971).
19. ABA Project, supra, n 17, at 14.
For an example of a proposed statutory
rule, see Note, The Lagging Right to a
Speedy Trial, 51 Va L Rev 1587, 1619
(1965).
20. E. g., Pines v District Court of
Woodbury County, 233 Iowa 1284, 10
NW2d 574 (1943). See generally Note,
The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57
Col L Rev 846, 853 (1957); Note, The
Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va
L Rev 1587, 1601-1602 (1965).
21. See State v Maldonado, 92 Ariz 70,
373 P2d 583 (en banc), cert denied, 371 US
928, 9 L Ed 2d 236, 83 S Ct 299 (1962);
Hicks v People, 148 Colo 26, 364 P2d 877
(1961) (en banc); People v Prosser, 309
NY 353, 130 NE2d 891 (1955); Zehrlaut v
State, 230 Ind 175, 102 NE2d 203 (1951);
Planary v Commonwealth, 184 Va 204, 35
SE2d 135 (1945); Ex parte Chalfant, 81
W Va 93, 93 SE 1032 (1917); State v
Hess, 180 Kan 472, 304 P2d 474 (1956);
State v Dodson, 226 Ore 458, 360 P2d 782
(1961). But see State v Vawter, 236 Ore
85, 386 P2d 915 (1963).
22. See United States v Hill, 310 F2d
[33 L Ed 2d]—8
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601 (CA4 1962); Bruce v United States,
351 F2d 318 (CA5 1965), cert denied, 384
US 921, 16 L Ed 2d 441, 86 $ Ct 1370
(1966); United States v Perez, 398 F2d
658 (CA7 1968), cert denied, 393 US 1080,
21 L Ed 2d 772, 89 S Ct 851 (I960); Pietch
v United States, 110 F2d 817 (CJA.10), cert
denied, 310 US 648, 84 L Ed 1414, 60
S Ct 1100, 129 ALR 563 (1940); Smith v
United States, 118 US App DC 38, 331 F2d
784 (DC 1964) (en banc). The opinion
below in this case demonstrates that the
Sixth Circuit takes a similar approach.
As an indication of the importance which
these courts have attached to the demand
rule, see Perez, supra, in which the Court
held that a defendant waived any speedy
trial claim, because he knew of an indictment and made no demand for an immediate trial, even though the recorcj gave no
indication that he was represented by
counsel at the time when he should have
made his demand, and even though he was
not informed by the court or the prosecution of his right to a speedy trial.
23. Although stating that they recognize a demand rule, the approach of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits seems to be
that a denial of speedy trial can be found
despite an absence of a demand under
some circumstances. See Bandy v United
States, 408 F2d 518 (CA8 1969) (a pur-

114

U. S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

waiver doctrine.
The demandwaiver doctrine provides that a defendant waives any consideration
of his right to speedy trial for any
period prior to which he has not
demanded a trial. Under this rigid
approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the consideration
of the speedy trial right. This essentially was the approach the Sixth
Circuit took below.
[15, 16] Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental
right 24 from inaction, is inconsistent
with this Court's pronouncements
on waiver of constitutional rights.
The Court has defined waiver as "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US
458, 464, 82 L Ed 1461, 1466, 58
S Ct 1019, 146 ALR 357 (1938).
Courts should Indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver,"
Aetna Ins. Co. v Kennedy, 301 US
389, 393, 81 L Ed 1177, 1180, 57
S Ct 809 (1937), and they should
"not presume acquiescence
[407 US 526]

in the
loss of fundamental rights." Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. v Public Utilities
Comm'n, 301 US 292, 307, 81 L Ed
1093, 1103, 57 S Ct 724 (1937). In
Carnley v Cochran, 369 US 506, 8
L Ed 2d 70, 82 S Ct 884 (1962), we
held:
poseful or oppressive delay may overcome
a failure to demand); Moser v United
States, 381 F2d 363 (CA9 1967) (despite a
failure to demand, the court balanced
other considerations).
The Second Circuit's approach is unclear.
There are cases in which a failure to
demand is strictly construed as a waiver.
E. g., United States v DeMasi, 445 F2d 251
(1971). In other cases, the Court has
seemed to be willing to consider claims in
which there was no demand. E. g.,
United States ex rel. Solomon v Mancusi, 412 F2H 88 (CA2), cert denied,
396 US 93<> *4 L Ed 2d 236, 90 S

33 L Ed 2d

"Presuming waiver from a silent
record is impermissible. The record
must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show,
that an accused was offered counsel
but intelligently and understandablyrejected the offer. Anything less is
not waiver." Id., at 516, 8 L Ed 2d
at 77.
The Court has ruled similarly with
respect to waiver of other rights
designed to protect the accused.
See, e. g., Miranda v Arizona, 384
US 436, 475-476, 16 L Ed 2d 694,
724, 86 S Ct 1602, 10 ALR3d 974
(1966); Boykin v Alabama, 395 US
238, 23 L Ed 2d 274, 89 S Ct 1709
(1969).
[17, 18] In excepting the right to
speedy trial from the rule of waiver
we have applied to other fundamental rights, courts that have applied the demand-waiver rule have
relied on the assumption that delay
usually works for the benefit of the
accused and on the absence of any
readily ascertainable time in the
criminal process for a defendant to
be given the choice of exercising or
waiving his right. But it is not
necessarily true that delay benefits
the defendant. There are cases in
which delay appreciably harms the
defendant's ability to defend himself.25
[407 US 527]

Moreover, a defendant conCt 269 (1969). Certainly the District
Courts in the Second Circuit have not regarded the demand rule as being rigid.
See United States v Mann, 291 F Supp 268
(SD NY 1968); United States v Dillon,
183 F Supp 541 (SD NY 1960).
The First Circuit also seems to reject
the more rigid approach. Compare United
States v Butler, 426 F2d 1275 (1970),
with Needel v Scafati, 412 F2d 761,
cert denied, 396 US 861, 24 L Ed 2d 113,
90 S C t 133 (1969).
24. See n 2, supra.
25. "If a defendant deliberately bypasses state procedure for some strategic,
[33 L Ed 2d]
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fined to jail prior to trial is obviously
disadvantaged by delay as is a defendant released on bail but unable
to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety.
[19-21] The nature of the speedy
trial right does make it impossible
to pinpoint a precise time in the
process when the right must be asserted or waived, but that fact does
not argue for placing the burden
of protecting the right solely on defendants. A defendant has no duty
to bring himself to trial ;26 the State
has that duty as well as the duty of
insuring that the trial is consistent
with due process.27 Moreover, for
the reasons earlier expressed, society has a particular interest in
bringing swift prosecutions, and
society's representatives are the
ones who should protect that interest.

ate some delay because he finds it
reasonable and helpful in preparing
his own case, he may be unable to
obtain a speedy trial for his client
at the end of that time. Since under
the demand-waiver rule no time
[407 US 5281
runs
until the demand is made, the government will have whatever time is
otherwise reasonable to bring the
defendant to trial after a demand
has been made. Thus, if the first
demand is made three months after
arrest in a jurisdiction which prescribes a six-month rule, the prosecution will have a total of nine
months—which may be wholly unreasonable under the circumstances.
The result in practice is likely to
be either an automatic, pro forma
demand made immediately after appointment of counsel or delays
which, but for the demand-waiver
rule, would not be tolerated. Such
a result is not consistent with the
[22] It is also noteworthy that interests of defendants, society, or
such a rigid view of the demand- the Constitution.
waiver rule places defense counsel in
an awkward position. Unless he de[23, 24] We reject, therefore, the
mands a trial early and often, he is rule that a defendant who fails to
in danger of frustrating his client's demand a speedy trial forever
right If counsel is willing to toler- waives his right.28 This does not
tactical, or other reason, a federal judge
on habeas corpus may deny relief if he
finds that the by-passing was the considered choice of the petitioner. The demand doctrine presupposes that failure to
demand trial is a deliberate choice for
supposed advantage on the assumption
that delay always benefits the accused, but
the delay does not inherently benefit the
accused any more than it does the state.
Consequently, a man should not be presumed to have exercised a deliberate choice
because of silence or inaction that could
equally mean that he is unaware of the
necessity for a demand." Note, The
Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va L
Rev 1587,1610 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
26. As Mr. Chief Justice Burger wrote
for the Court in Dickey v Florida:
Although a great many accused persons
seek to put off the confrontation as long
as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry

into criminal charges is fundamental asid
the duty of the charging authority is to
provide a prompt trial." 398 US 30, 3738, 26 L Ed 2d 26, 31, 32, 90 S Ct 1564
(1970) (footnote omitted).
27. As a circuit judge, Mr. Justice
Blackmun wrote:
"The government and, for that matter,
the trial court are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal
cases. The burden for trial promptness is
not solely upon the defense. The right to
'a speedy . . . trial' is constitutionally
guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable." Hodges v United States, 408
F2d 543, 551 (CA8 1969).
28. The American Bar Association also
rejects the rigid demand-waiver rule:
"One reason for this position is that
there are a number of situations, such as
where the defendant is unaware of the
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basis. We can do little more than
mean, however, that the defendant
has no responsibility to assert his
right. We think the better rule is
that the defendant's assertion of or
failure to assert his right to a
speedy trial is one of the factors to
be considered in an inquiry into the
deprivation of the right. Such a
formulation avoids the rigidities of
the demand-waiver rule and the resulting possible unfairness in its application. It allows the trial court
[407 US 529]
to exercise a judicial discretion
based on the circumstances, including due consideration of any applicable formal procedural rule. It
would permit, for example, a court
to attach a different weight to a
situation in which the defendant
knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client, or from
a situation in which no counsel is appointed. It would also allow a court
to weigh the frequency and force of
the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely
pro forma objection.

involved rights which must be exercised or waived at a specific time or
under clearly identifiable circumstances, such as the rights to plead
not guilty, to demand a jury trial,
to exercise the privilege against self
incrimination, and to have the assistance of counsel. We have shown
above that the right to a speedy
trial is unique in its uncertainty as
to when and under what circumstances it must be asserted or may
be deemed waived. But the rule we
announce today, which comports
with constitutional principles, places
the primary ~ burden on the courts
and the prosecutors to assure that
cases are brought to trial. We
hardly need add that if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his
waiver may be given effect under
standard waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside.

[25, 26] In ruling that a defendant has some responsibility to assert
a speedy trial claim, we do not
depart from our holdings in other
cases concerning the waiver of
fundamental rights, in which we
have placed the entire responsibility
on the prosecution to show that the
claimed waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily made. Such cases have

fundamental. The approach
we accept is a balancing test, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.29

charge or where the defendant is without
counsel, in which it is unfair to require a
demand . . . .
Jurisdictions with a
demand requirement are faced with the
continuing problem of defining exceptions,
a process which has not always been carried out with uniformity . . . .
More
important, the demand requirement is inconsistent with the public interest in
prompt disposition of criminal cases. . . .
[T]he trial of a criminal case should not

be unreasonably delayed merely because
the defendant does not think that it is in
his best interest to seek prompt disposition of the charge." ABA Project, supra,
n 17, at 17.
29. Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive
rule adopted by a court in the exercise of
its supervisory powers which establishes a
fixed time period within which cases must
normally be brought. See n 18, supra.

[27] We, therefore, reject both of
the inflexible approaches—the fixedtime period because it goes further
than the Constitution requires; the
demand-waiver rule because it is insensitive to a right which we have
deemed
[407 US 530]

IV
[28, 29] A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc
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basis. We can do little more than
identify some of the factors which
courts should assess in determining
whether a particular defendant has
been deprived of his right. Though
some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason
for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant.30

[30] The length of the delay is to
some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay
which is presumptively prejudicial,
there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors that go into the
balance. Nevertheless, because of
the imprecision of the right to
speedy trial, the length of delay
that will provoke such an inquiry
is necessarily dependent upon the
peculiar
[407 US 531]

arate attempt to delay ihe trial in
order to hamper the defense should
be weighed heavily agairist the government.32 A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded
courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must
rest with the government rather
than with the defendant. Finally,
a valid reason, such as a missing
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
[32, 33] We have already discussed the third factor, t(he defendant's responsibility to assert his
right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related
to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts
will be affected by the length of the
delay, to some extent by the reason
for the delay, and most particularly
by the personal prejudice, which is
not always readily identifiable, that
he experiences. The more serious
the deprivation, the moife likely a
defendant is to complain The defendant's assertion of fyis speedy
trial right, then, is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining

circumstances of the case.31
To take but one example, the delay
that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably
less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
[31] Closely related to length of
delay is the reason the government
[407 US 532]
assigns to justify the delay. Here,
too, different weights should be as- whether the defendant is being designed to different reasons. A delib- prived of the right. We emphasize
30. See, e. g., United States v Simmons,
338 F2d 804, 807 (CA2 1964), cert denied,
380 US 983, 14 L Ed 2d 276, 85 S Ct 1352
1965); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial,
20 Stan L Rev 476, 478, note 15 (1968).
In his concurring opinion in Dickey, Mr.
Justice Brennan identified three factors
for consideration: the source of the delay,
the reasons for it, and whether the delay
prejudiced the interests protected by the
right. 398 US, at 48, 26 L Ed 2d at 38.
He included consideration of the defendant's failure to assert his right in the
cause-of-delay category, and he thought
the length of delay was relevant primarily
to the reasons for delay and its prejudicial effects. Id., n 12. In essence,
however, there is little difference between

his approach and the one we adopt today.
See also Note, the Right to a Speedy Trial,
supra, for another slightly efferent approach.
31. For example, the Ffrst Circuit
thought a delay of nine months overly
long, absent a good reason, in a case that
depended on eyewitness testimony. United
States v Butler, 426 F2d 1275, 1277 (1970).
32. We have indicated on previous occasions that it is improper for the prosecution intentionally to delay "to gain some
tactical advantage over [defendants] or
to harass them." United States v Marion,
404 US 307, 325 (1971). See Pollard v
United States, 352 US 354, 361, 1 L Ed
2d 393, 399, 77 S Ct 481 (195?).
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that failure to assert the right will
make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy
trial.

it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer
little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs.34 The time spent
[34] A fourth factor is prejudice in
[407 US 533]
to the defendant. Prejudice, of
jail is simply dead time. Morecourse, should be assessed in the over, if a defendant is locked up,
light of the interests of defendants he is hindered in his ability to
which the speedy trial right was gather evidence, contact witnesses,
designed to protect. This Court has or otherwise prepare his defense.35
identified three such interests: (i) Imposing those consequences on
to prevent oppressive pretrial in- anyone who has not yet been concarceration; (ii) to minimize anxi- victed is-serious. It is especially
ety and concern of the accused; and unfortunate to impose them on
(iii) to limit the possibility that the those persons who are ultimately
defense will be impaired.33 Of fouiid to be innocent. Finally, even
these, the most serious .is the last, if an accused is not incarcerated
because the inability of a defendant prior to trial, he is still disadvanadequately to prepare his case taged by restraints on his liberty
skews the fairness of the entire sys- and by living under a cloud of anxitem. If witnesses die or disappear ety, suspicion, and often hostility.
during a delay, the prejudice is See cases cited in n 33, supra.
obvious. There is also prejudice if
defense witnesses are unable to re[37] We regard none of the four
call accurately events of the distant factors identified above as either a
past. Loss of memory, however, is necessary or sufficient condition to
not always reflected in the record the finding of a deprivation of the
because what has been forgotten can right of speedy trial. Rather, they
rarely be shown.
are related factors and must be con[35, 36] We have discussed pre- sidered together with such other cirviously the societal disadvantages cumstances as may be relevant. In
of lengthy pretrial incarceration, sum, these factors have no talisbut obviously the disadvantages for manic qualities; courts must still
and sensitive
the accused who cannot obtain his engage in a difficult
38
balancing
process.
But, because
release are even more serious. The
time spent in jail awaiting trial has we are dealing with a fundamental
a detrimental impact on the individ- right of the accused, this process
ual. It often means loss of a job; must be carried out with full recog33. United States v Ewell, 383 US, at
120, 15 L Ed 2d, at 630; Smith v Hooey,
393 US 374, 377-378, 21 L Ed 2d 607,
610-611, 89 S Ct 575 (1969). In Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213, 221222, 18 L Ed 2d 1, 6-7, 87 S Ct 988
(1967), we indicated that a defendant
awaiting trial on bond might be subjected to public scorn, deprived of employment, and chilled in the exercise of
his right to speak for, associate with, and
participate in unpopular political causes.
34. See To Establish Justice, To Insure
Domestic Tranquility, Final Report of the

National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence 152 (1969).
35. There is statistical evidence that
persons who are detained between arrest
and trial are more likely to receive prison
sentences than those who obtain pretrial
release, although other factors bear upon
this correlation. See Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 NYU L Rev 631 (1964).
36. For an example of how the speedy
trial issue should be approached, see Judge
Frankel's excellent opinion in United
States v Mann, 291 F Supp 268 (SD NY
1968).
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nition that the accused's interest in and represented him throughout the
a speedy trial is specifically affirmed period. No question is raised as to
in the Constitution.
the competency of sucli counsel.37
Despite the fact that counsel had
notice of the motions for continuances,38 the record shows no action
The difficulty of the task of bal- whatever taken between October 21,
ancing these factors is illustrated by 1958, and February 12, 1962, that
this case, which we consider to be could be construed as the assertion
close* It is clear that the length of the speedy trial right. On the
of delay between arrest and trial— latter date, in response to another
well over five years—was extraor- motion for continuance, Barker
dinary. Only
moved
[407 US 534]
[407 US 535]
seven months of
to
dismiss
indictment.
that period can be attributed to a The record does notthe
show
on what
strong excuse, the illness of the ex- ground this motion was based,
alsheriff who was in charge of the in- though it is clear that no alternavestigation. Perhaps some delay tive motion was made for an imwould have been permissible under mediate trial. Instead the record
ordinary circumstances, so that strongly
that while he
Manning could be utilized as a wit- hoped to suggests
take
advantage
of the
ness in Barker's trial, but more than delay in which he had acquiesced,
four years was too long a period, and thereby obtain a dismissal of
particularly since a good part of the charges, he definitely did not
that period was attributable to the want to be tried. Counsel conceded
Commonwealth's failure or inability as much at oral argument:
to try Manning under circumstances
"Your honor, I would concede that
that comported with due process.
Willie Mae Barker probably—I
Two counterbalancing factors, don't know this for a fact—probably
however, outweigh these deficien- did not want to be tried. I don't
cies. The first is that prejudice was think any man wants to be tried.
minimal. Of course, Barker was And I don't consider this & liability
prejudiced to some extent by living on his behalf. I don't blame him."
for over four years under a cloud of Tr. of Oral Arg. 39.
suspicion and anxiety. Moreover, The probable reason for Barker's
although he was released on bond attitude was that he was gambling
for most of the period, he did spend on Manning's acquittal. The evi10 months in jail before trial. But dence was not very strong
there is no claim that any of Bark- against Manning, as the reversals
er's witnesses died or otherwise be- and hung juries suggest, and Barker
came unavailable owing to the undoubtedly thought that if Mandelay. The trial transcript indicates ning were acquitted, he would never
only two very minor lapses of be tried. Counsel also conceded
memory—one on the part of a this:
prosecution witness—which were in
"Now, it's true that the reason
no way significant to the outcome.
for
this delay was the CommonMore important than the absence
wealth
of Kentucky's desire to
of serious prejudice, is the fact that
secure
the
testimony of the accomBarker did not want a speedy trial.
Counsel was appointed for Barker
37. Tr of Oral Arg 39.
immediately after his indictment
38. Id., at 4.
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plice, Silas Manning. And it's true which an indictment may be disthat if Silas Manning were never missed on speedy trial grounds
convicted, Willie Mae Barker would where the defendant has failed to
never have been convicted. We object to continuances. There may
concede this." Id., at 15.39
be a situation in which the defend[407 US 536]
ant was represented by incompetent
That Barker was gambling on counsel, was severely prejudiced, or
Manning's acquittal is also sug- even cases in which the continugested by his failure, following the ances were granted ex parte. But
pro forma motion to dismiss filed in barring
circumFebruary 1962, to object to the stances, weextraordinary
would
be
reluctant
inCommonwealth's next two motions
deed
to
rule
that
a
defendant
was
for continuances. Indeed, it was
not until March 1963, after Man- denied this constitutional right on
ning's convictions were final, that a record that strongly indicates, as
Barker, having lost his gamble, does this one, that the defendant did
began to object to furtHer continu- not want a speedy trial. We hold,
ances. At that time, the Common- therefore, that Barker was not
wealth's excuse was the illness of deprived of his due process right to
the ex-sheriff, which Barker has a speedy trial.
conceded justified the further
The judgment of the Court of
delay,40
Appeals is
[38,39] We do not hold that
there may never be a situation in
Affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINION

Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. wealth's point of view, it is fortuJustice Brennan joins, concurring. nate that the case was set for early
trial and that postponements took
Although the Court rejects peti- place only upon formal requests to
tioner's speedy trial claim and af- which Barker had opportunity to
firms denial of his petition for object.
habeas corpus,
Because the Court broadly essays
[407 US 537]
it is apparent that the factors going into constitutional
had Barker not-so clearly acquiesced judgments under the speedy trial
in the major delays involved in this provision, it is appropriate to emcase, the result would have been phasize that one of the major purotherwise. From the Common- poses of the provision is to guard
39. Hindsight is, of course, 20/20, but
we cannot help noting that if Barker had
moved immediately and persistently for a
speedy trial following indictment, and if
he had been successful, he would have undoubtedly been acquitted, since Manning's
testimony was crucial to the Commonwealth's case. It could not have been anticipated at the outset, however, that Manning would have been tried six times over
a four-year period. Thus, the decision to
gamble on Manning's acquittal may have
been a prudent choice at the time it was
made.

40. At oral argument, counsel for Barker stated:
"That was after the sheriff, the material witness, was ill; the man who had
arrested the petitioner, yes. And the Sixth
Circuit held that this was a sufficient reason for delay, and we don't deny this. We
concede that this was sufficient for the
delay from March 1963 to October, but it
does not explain the delays prior to that."
Tr of Oral Arg 19-20.

